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ABSTRACT 
Social media provides political news and information for both active duty military personnel and veterans. We analyze 
the subgroups of Twitter and Facebook users who spend time consuming junk news from websites that target US military 
personnel and veterans with conspiracy theories, misinformation, and other forms of junk news about military affairs and 
national security issues. (1) Over Twitter we find that there are significant and persistent interactions between current 
and former military personnel and a broad network of extremist, Russia-focused, and international conspiracy 
subgroups. (2) Over Facebook, we find significant and persistent interactions between public pages for military and 
veterans and subgroups dedicated to political conspiracy, and both sides of the political spectrum. (3) Over Facebook, 
the users who are most interested in conspiracy theories and the political right seem to be distributing the most junk 
news, whereas users who are either in the military or are veterans are among the most sophisticated news consumers, 
and share very little junk news through the network. 
 
US MILITARY PERSONNEL, VETERANS AND 
SOCIAL MEDIA 
Social media are an important means of communication 
for both active duty military personnel and veterans. 
When on assignment, platforms like Facebook and 
Twitter can allow service personnel to stay in touch with 
family and friends back home. After service, social 
media allow soldiers and support staff to stay in touch 
with their colleagues and friends from their period of 
service, which performs an important role in veteran 
transition into civilian life.1   
The pubic tends to place trust in military personnel 
and veterans,2 making them potentially influential voters 
and community leaders. Given this trust and their role in 
ensuring national security, these individuals have the 
potential to become particular targets for influence 
operations and information campaigns conducted on 
social media. There are already reports of US service 
personnel being confronted by foreign intelligence 
agencies while posted abroad, with details of their 
personal lives gleaned from social media.3  
We set about mapping the influence of known sources 
of junk political news and information that regularly craft 
content for an audience of US military personnel and 
veterans–we call such activity Veteran Operations or 
“VetOps”. In particular, we investigate patterns of 
interaction between current or former military personnel 
who have (i) shared junk news targeted to an audience of 
military personnel, (ii) engaged with users who 
disseminate large amounts of misinformation about 
national security and international affairs. 
 
SOCIAL NETWORK MAPPING 
Visualizing social network data is one of the most 
powerful ways of understanding how people pass 
information and associate with one another. By using 
selected keywords, seed accounts, and known links to 
content, it is possible to construct large network 
visualizations. The underlying networks of these 
visualizations can then be manipulated to find 
communities of accounts and clusters of association. 
Importantly, one can then tag these associated clusters of 
accounts and content with political attributes based on 
knowledge of account history, content type, and 
association metrics. 
Each map of social networks constructed over Twitter 
and Facebook allows for insight into both social structure 
and flow of information. In this study, we use the 
Graphika visualization suite to map and tag accounts 
based around prominent political accounts, topics, 
political affiliations, and geographical areas. Successfully 
mapping social networks also allows us to catalogue 
users and content and generate both descriptive statistics 
and statistical models that explain changes in network 
structure. 
Social network maps are composed of “nodes” which 
represent the social media accounts in question. Each 
node is connected to one or more further nodes in the 
map via social relationships; digital interactions between 
accounts. These maps then represent patterns of 
connections between nodes via a Fruchterman-Reingold 
visualization algorithm.4 This visualization algorithm 
works to place nodes in a map onto a canvas according to 
two principles: first, a “centrifugal force” acts upon each 
node to push it to the edge of the canvas; second, a 
“cohesive force” acts upon every connected pair of nodes 
to pull them closer together. 
Each node in these networks belongs to a group with 
a shared pattern of interests, such as a collection of 
Facebook accounts that all like US pro-Donald Trump 
political pages, for example. A group is a collection of 
segments that are geographically, culturally, or socially 
similar. For example, a segment of US Trump supporters, 
US Libertarians, and US Constitutional Conservatives 
could be grouped into a “US Conservatives” group. The 
method of segmenting users, coding groups, and 
generating broad observations about association is an 
iterative process that involves qualitative, quantitative 
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and computational methods. It was run on several 
occasions over a period of time to identify the stable and 
consistent communities.  
A clustering algorithm automatically generates 
segments and groups from the sampled data. This 
involves first building a bipartite graph between nodes in 
the map and the rest of the social medium in question. 
This bipartite graph provides a structural similarity 
metric between nodes in the map, and this metric is used 
in combination with a clustering algorithm in order to 
segment a map into distinct communities. In this case 
hierarchical agglomerative clustering was used (see 
online supplement).  Additional information on the 
grounded typology of junk news, developed over the 
course of studying five elections in 2016-17 is in  our 
series of Data Memos 2016.1-2017.8.5–8 
Over time, we found that different social media have 
different attributes that are effective for identifying 
temporally stable communities, i.e. ones that persist over 
time. For example, clustering Twitter users by following 
and follower relationships yields much more stable 
communities than clustering the same by mention or 
retweet relationship. In Facebook clustering by the “like” 
relationship yields similarly stable results. Therefore, 
within a Facebook map, all pages liked by the public 
pages in question are identified in the map, and the extent 
to which two Facebook pages like similar pages in all of 
Facebook generates a higher similarity metric. 
The outputs of this algorithm have been extensively 
tested in studying social media maps of Iran and 
Russia.9,10 Subsequent to clustering, the map-making 
process then uses supervised machine learning to 
generate labels for segments and groups from a set of 
human-labeled examples. The machine-generated labels 
are then manually verified by human coders.  
 
SAMPLING AND METHOD 
For this study, three junk news websites specializing in 
content on military affairs and national security issues for 
US military personnel and veterans were used; 
veteranstoday.com, veteransnewsnow.com, and 
southfront.org. All three of these websites are reported to 
show links with Russian-origin content. In late 2013 
Veterans Today began publishing content from the 
government-charted Russian Academy of Sciences 
geopolitical journal New Eastern Outlook. At a similar 
time, its sister site, Veterans News Now, began 
publishing content from the Moscow think tank Strategic 
Culture Foundation. Similarly, the website South Front, 
was registered in Moscow in early 2015 and partnered 
with Veterans Today later that year.11 
We use the term “junk news” to include various 
forms of propaganda and ideologically extreme, hyper-
partisan, or conspiratorial political news and information. 
Much of this content is deliberately produced false 
reporting. It seeks to persuade readers about the moral 
virtues or failings of organizations, causes or people and 
presents commentary as a news product. This content is 
produced by organizations that do not employ 
professional journalists, and the content uses attention 
grabbing techniques, lots of pictures, moving images, 
excessive capitalization, ad hominem attacks, 
emotionally charged words and pictures, unsafe 
generalizations and other logical fallacies. 
Associated social media accounts and URLs for these 
sites were identified and then used to map out the wider 
network. This network is comprised of all of the accounts 
to which a particular campaign is visible, including 
accounts which are not actively participating in the 
conversation but rather simply consuming information.  
For the Twitter analysis, we used our seed list to 
identify a broad network of Twitter users that were 
following, mentioning, or citing content related to 
veterans. For the analysis of Facebook public pages, we 
conducted a snowball sample of public pages that 
directly liked or were liked by the seed pages. 
 
VETERAN OPERATIONS ON TWITTER  
Our Twitter dataset contains 28,467 Twitter users 
collected between April 2, 2017 and May 2, 2017. We 
collected data by identifying all Twitter accounts who 
followed and mentioned three prominent military-
focused junk news accounts: @VeteransToday, 
@SouthFronteng, @veteransnewsnow. We then reduced 
this space of Twitter users to a set of well-connected 
accounts using a variant of k-core reduction (see online 
supplement).12 This reduced account set contained 12,413 
Twitter users. Finally, we collected all Twitter users 
followed by any account in the reduced account set, in 
order to segment this set into communities of interest. 
We used a combination of Twitter’s Public and 
Streaming APIs and the GNIP API to collect publicly 
available data for analyses. Twitter’s Public API provides 
data on a) who follows whom on Twitter (100% of all 
data) and b) recent tweets for each user (up to 3,200 
tweets by user in reverse chronological order). The 
Streaming API allows for constraining queries to users 
who use particular keywords in their tweets or users who 
post tweets from a specified geographical area.  
Twitter limits API access in several ways: a) by 
limiting streaming queries to tracking a certain number of 
Twitter accounts, keywords, or geographical areas, b) by 
constraining Decahose GNIP queries to a random 10% 
sample of all tweets, and c) by limiting data returned 
from all APIs exclusively to public (not private or 
banned) Twitter accounts. We address limitations a and b 
by using a combination of public, streaming, and GNIP 
API queries. In other words, we perform an initial 
combination of GNIP and streaming API queries that 
generate results we can use for a more expansive public 
API query on tweet histories and follow relationships. 
We do not believe that this limitation is a concern in this 
study given that 88% of Twitter users have public 
accounts.13 
We were able to group the 12,413 user accounts that 
were sampled into eight categories of affiliation. The 
categories emerged through network association and 
interpretation of the kinds of content these users 
distribute and indicate as “favorite”. Table 1 identifies 
the main groupings of the audience of military junk 
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news, as labeled by our iterative machine-learning and 
expert review.  
For the entire network consuming information from 
military-oriented junk news websites, we can identify the 
number of accounts that directly share information of 
interest. To assist in the evaluation of this network we 
have computed the coverage and consistency of each 
group. Coverage refers to the percentage of all known 
junk news domains that a group posted links to. 
Consistency refers to the proportion of all hits on every 
domain that came from the group. A high value of 
coverage shows that the group is consuming a wide range 
of junk news on military affairs and national security, 
while a high value for consistency shows that the group 
is playing a large role in the distribution of such junk 
news. Coverage and Consistency were both calculated 
from a matrix of hits from groups to known Junk News, 
State Sponsored and Vet Ops domains. 
Additionally, a value of heterophily for each 
combination of group pairings was calculated. This is a 
measure of the connections between groups in a map, 
whereby a ratio is calculated of the actual ties between 
two groups compared to the expected ties between the 
groups, if all the accounts in the map were evenly 
distributed. A natural log of the ratios is then taken along 
with a zero correction to create a balanced index. A 
higher heterophily score between groups indicates more 
connections between two groups, while a high 
heterophily score for a group to itself indicates a high 
number of within-group connections.  It is important to 
note however that these scores indicate only first order 
connections between groups, and not second, third, or 
higher order connections. These values are shown in 
Table 2. 
Figure 1 shows a basic visualization of the network 
map organized into eight groups. For the full 
visualization of all accounts separated into 45 segments 
within the eight groups, please see the online addendum 
at comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk. On the left of Figure 1 is the 
Russia-Focused group, which consists mostly of Pro-
Putin trolls with some more internationally focused 
clusters such as Pro-Assad, Pro-Russia or Pro-Trump. 
While some clusters in this group, such as Pro-Putin 
Trolls, include accounts that tweet in Russian, other 
clusters, such as Pro-Putin Russian Trolls Abroad, tweet 
in a mixture of English and Russian, and can connect 
with English-speaking audiences. These clusters 
generally tweet in support of Putin’s agenda, whether 
within the borders of Russia, in the Middle East, or as 
regards the US and President Trump. For the twitter 
network we automatically label clusters using a 
supervised learning algorithm. A human subject matter 
expert reviews the labels to ensure accuracy. 
Next to the Russia-Focus group is an International 
Conspiracy Theory and Issue-Specific group. This group 
includes clusters such as Russia Today and WikiLeaks 
(users who follow and tweet links from both RT.com, a 
Russian news site, and WikiLeaks); Anti-NWO 
(conspiracy theorists who oppose an international “New 
World Order”); Pro-Palestine, and US Libertarian 
accounts. The unifying theme of this group is 
international with a conspiracy theory focus. For 
example, accounts in this group oppose big government, 
and spread conspiratorial messages about the Rothschild 
family. 
Table 1: Size, Coverage and Consistency of VetOps Audience Groups 
on Twitter 
 Users 
N 
Users 
% 
Coverage Consistency 
Conservative Politics 1,637 13 88 31 
Euro-Right 398 3 88 9 
Government and Public Policy 1,168 9 61 1 
International Conspiracy Theory  1,364 11 94 17 
Liberal Politics  840 7 92 10 
Other 3,355 27 100 20 
Russia Focused  1,545 12 82 11 
Veterans & Military 2,106 17 55 1 
Total 12,413    
 
Table 2: Heterophily Index for VetOps Audience Groups on Twitter 
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Conservative Politics  5 4 3 2 2 3 2 3 
Euro-Right  - 5 1 4 3 3 3 1 
Government and Public Policy - - 4 1 3 3 0 4 
International Conspiracy - - - 4 4 3 4 0 
Liberal Politics  - - - - 5 3 3 2 
Other - - - - - 3 3 3 
Russia Focused - - - - - - 5 0 
Veterans and Military - - - - - - - 5 
 
Figure 1:  VetOps Audience Groups on Twitter 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from data sampled 02/4/-02/5/ 2017. 
Note: Groups are determined through network association and our 
interpretation of the kinds of content these users distribute. This is a 
basic visualization, see comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk for a full visualization. 
Here, each group is represented by a single node. Node size shows the 
number of users in this group, while edge width shows the strength of  
the connection between the groups. 
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Table 3: Size, Coverage and Consistency of VetOps Audience Sub-
Groups on Facebook 
 Users 
N 
Users 
% Coverage Consistency 
Conspiracy 442 4 80 13 
Mental Health 146 1 4 0 
Other 5,032 45 96 33 
Political Left 1,533 14 90 22 
Political Right 740 7 82 24 
Sustainable Agriculture 637 6 49 3 
US Military 1,196 11 31 2 
US Veterans 1,377 12 43 3 
Total 11,103    
 
Table 4: Heterophily Index for VetOps Audience Sub-Groups on 
Facebook 
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Conspiracy 6 3 4 4 4 4 1 1 
Mental Health - 8 3 1 1 2 2 3 
Other - - 2 4 4 3 3 3 
Political Left - - - 5 2 3 1 1 
Political Right - - - - 6 3 2 3 
Sustainable Agriculture - - - - - 6 0 1 
US Military - - - - - - 5 4 
US Veterans - - - - - - - 5 
 
Figure 2: VetOps Audience Sub-Groups on Facebook 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from data sampled 26/5/-25/6/ 2017. 
Note: Sub-groups are determined through network association and 
our interpretation of the kinds of content these users distribute. This 
is a basic visualization, see comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk for a full 
visualization. Here, each group is represented by a single node. 
Node size shows the number of users in this group, while edge width 
shows the strength of the connection between the groups as 
heterophily index. 
In the middle of Figure 1, at the top, is a US 
Conservative Politics group. This group includes a 
breadth of US conservative communities, from 
supporters of President Trump to Tea Partiers to 
Constitutional Conservatives and conservative pundits. 
This group includes accounts related to InfoWars and 
other news websites that have been accused of spreading 
fake news and conspiracy theories in the past14. This 
group is partially composed of accounts that consider 
troll or bot accounts in their Twitter activity, and partially 
composed of genuine US conservatives, but the 
sophisticated behavior of troll and bot accounts makes 
precise disambiguation of these two categories difficult. 
Finally, to the right of the Conservative Politics group 
is a Veterans and Military group. This group consists of 
segments devoted to the various branches of the US 
Military (such as Army, National Guard, or Navy and 
Marines), US Veterans and their support, and military 
families. These segments include prominent accounts for 
US Veteran advocacy groups, non-profits, and 
government organizations devoted to veteran affairs. 
These accounts may be troll or bot accounts in their 
Twitter activity, but are genuine participants in the space 
around US Military and Veterans.  
Other, less active groups on the map include Liberal 
Politics, Euro-Right, and Government and Public Policy. 
These groups represent other contributors to the politics 
around US Military and Veterans affairs. It is notable that 
Euro-Right, which includes a UKIP cluster, is present on 
this map, despite the map’s focus on US veterans. 
The Other group includes accounts that did not meet a 
connectivity threshold for belonging in any one cluster. 
Such accounts included those labeled as Central and 
Eastern European Politics, Foreign Policy, as well as 
Social Media Marketing, Pop Culture and Spam 
accounts.  
Overall this presents a picture with three distinct 
categories. First, we find genuine accounts concerning 
US Military and Veterans affairs. Second, we identify a 
mixture of genuine accounts and possible troll accounts 
in the space of US conservative politics. Third, we 
identify accounts whose activity may involve trolls or 
bots in the space of pro-Putin Russian politics and 
international conspiracy theories. The Fruchterman-
Rheingold algorithm places accounts in the second 
category between those of the other categories, 
suggesting that the US conservative politics group is a 
mediator or network bridge that allows for a flow of 
information between Russian troll networks and US 
Military Personnel and veterans on Twitter. 
When combined with the heterophily index in Table 2 
these values can help clarify the observations. The 
highest value of heterophily between the Russia-focused 
Table 5: Types of News Content Shared Among VetOps Users, by 
Sub-Groups 
 Junk 
 
Professional State 
Sponsored 
VetOps Total 
 % % % % % N 
Conspiracy  21 73 6 0.7 100 1,521 
Mental Health 2 98 0 0.0 100 92 
Other 16 81 3 0.6 100 5,287 
Political Left 9 88 3 0.2 100 5,579 
Political Right 22 76 2 0.2 100 3,134 
Sustainable 
Agriculture 
7 90 3 0.5 100 972 
US Military 7 92 1 0.2 100 638 
US Veterans 7 92 1 0.3 100 1,231 
Total 14 83 3 0.4 100  
Source: Authors’ calculations from data sampled 26/5/-25/6/ 2017. 
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group and any other group is with the Conspiracy Theory 
group at 4 followed by the Euro-right group at 3. All 
other levels of heterophily are lower, suggesting that the 
Russian focused group, while present in the network, is 
fairly isolated, mostly having ties with fringe groups 
without having formed deep direct connections within 
US Military and Veteran communities online. 
Conversely, the level of connection between US Military 
and Veteran Networks and Conservative Politics at 3 is 
substantial enough to allow for the flow of information. 
An additional interesting finding is the high level of 
connection between US Liberal Politics and International 
Conspiracy Groups suggesting that this might not be a 
wholly conservative phenomenon.  
 
VETERAN OPERATIONS ON PUBLIC 
FACEBOOK PAGES 
Using the content that was distributed by users in the 
Twitter phase of this research, we proceeded to map the 
public Facebook pages that are sharing content from 
veteran misinformation campaigns. 
 We harvested Facebook public page seeds from 
the Twitter network and performed a snowball sample to 
discover the wider Facebook network around these key 
online interest groups. This was then combined with the 
network discovered by an initial Facebook snowball 
sample based on known military-oriented junk news. 
This snowball sampling method involved collecting all 
the pages that either directly liked or were liked by the 
Facebook accounts of the known junk news sites.  
This sampling resulted in a network of 11,103 public 
Facebook pages. From this set we collected all posts 
made in the last year (8,178,004), extracted all URLs 
from the posts, and analyzed the pattern of web citations 
across the major groupings in the VetOps Facebook 
Network. Additionally, we collected the share counts for 
all posts containing these URLs in order to measure the 
degree to which web content from various sources is 
shared more widely across the Facebook network (this 
value includes shares that occur on private pages). 
 Table 3 and Figure 2 shown the groups generated 
from the Facebook sample, along with heterophily index 
and the network map. On Facebook eight groups were 
identified and labeled: Conspiracy Theory, Mental 
Health, Political Left, Political Right, Sustainable 
Agriculture, US Military, US Veterans, and Other. These 
groupings are similar to those found in the Twitter 
network, however with a few key differences: Initially 
the map shows an absence of activity outside the US. 
This is expected, as the map includes only US-focused 
clusters. Secondly, the Facebook map has an additional 
grouping of Sustainable Agriculture. While this may 
initially appear out of place in a map of US Veterans, a 
deeper qualitative analysis of this group revealed it to be 
a frontier of conspiracy theory activity, including both 
ostensibly right-wing and left-wing accounts. Thirdly, the 
Facebook map includes a Mental Health group, including 
communities focused on sobriety, addiction recovery and 
life coaching or meditation. Finally, the Facebook map 
includes a group on Fringe Conservative US politics 
including survivalists and preppers (“prepared”) 
communities. 
The heterophily index for this network indicates that 
the US Military and US Veteran Networks have deep 
connections with each other with a value of 4, while the 
Facebook map mirrors the Twitter map in showing 
developed connections between both the Political Left 
and Political Right with the Conspiracy Theory Group. 
There are also dense connections between the Conspiracy 
Theory Group and the Sustainable Agriculture Group 
with a value of 4.  
The Other group includes issue segments concerning 
Anarchists, Animal Lovers, News and US Conservatives, 
and Syria. The high heterophily index for this group is 
found to be coming from interactions between these 
segments, which are not related to the rest of the map. 
These segments are fairly small, with the largest being 
News & US Conservatives.  
In addition to the grouping of Facebook pages we 
were also able to perform an analysis of the content 
shared across the network in the form of URL links to 
external sites. We collected all URLs shared by any 
member of the groups identified in the network. We then 
classified types of news content into four categories; 
Junk News, Professional News, State Sponsored News, 
and news coming from the original VetOps accounts. 
This classification was based on a known dictionary of 
news sites, generated through manually coding the base 
URL of each site using a grounded typology in previous 
research—for detailed description see COMPROP Data 
Memo 2017.6.15 This analysis is presented in Table 5, 
and shows that legitimate professional journalistic 
content was shared far more widely than junk news 
across the Facebook network, at a ratio of six links to 
professional news content for every one link to junk 
content. Additionally, it is shown that the Political Right 
group shared the highest proportion of Junk News across 
the Facebook network, 22%, followed by the Conspiracy 
Group, 21%. Conspiracy groups also shared the highest 
proportion of content that could be attributed to a foreign 
state actor with 6% of content shared in this category. 
Finally, both US Military and US Veteran Groups shared 
a low but significant proportion of Junk News content at 
7% and showed a small but present interaction with 
VetOps content at 0.2-0.3% of total shares. 
When comparing the number of times that individual 
content was shared across the network, we found that 
state sponsored and junk news content tended to have 
specific “amplifier” accounts. These accounts tend to do 
a lot of sharing, but the content they push out tends not 
be further shared by other users. Overall, VetOps pages 
and content were not shown to be especially influential 
on Facebook, in contrast to our results from Twitter 
analysis. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The social networks mapped over Twitter and Facebook 
include both genuine accounts created by the US military 
organizations, by service personnel and veterans 
themselves, and by groups seeking to influence those 
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users. Some of the accounts are pro-Putin accounts 
pushing out significant amounts of Russian-oriented 
content. While Russia-aligned user accounts have built 
some links to an audience of current and former US 
military personnel, the level of this engagement is deeper 
on Twitter than on Facebook. 
We find that on Twitter there are significant and 
persistent interactions between current and former 
military personnel and a broad network of Russia-
focused accounts, conspiracy theory focused accounts, 
and European right-wing accounts. These interactions are 
often mediated by pro-Trump users and accounts that 
identify with far-right political movements in the US.  
 
ONLINE SUPPLEMENTS AND DATA SHEETS 
Please visit comprop.oii.ox.ac.uk for additional material 
related to the analysis, including (a) high-resolution maps 
of the networks for both Twitter and Facebook, showing 
all accounts separated into 45 segments within the 8 
groups, (b) the full list of segments and groups, (c) 
calculation of heterophily scores (d) more detailed 
explanation of the hierarchical agglomerative clustering 
algorithm used to create groupings, (e) k-core reduction 
used to reduce set of Twitter users. 
 
ABOUT THE PROJECT 
The Project on Computational Propaganda 
(www.politicalbots.org) involves international, and 
interdisciplinary, researchers in the investigation of the 
impact of automated scripts—computational 
propaganda—on public life. Data Memos are designed to 
present quick snapshots of analysis on current events in a 
short format. They reflect methodological experience and 
considered analysis, but have not been peer-reviewed. 
Working Papers present deeper analysis and extended 
arguments that have been collegially reviewed and that 
engage with public issues. The Project’s articles, book 
chapters and books are significant manuscripts that have 
been through peer review and formally published.  
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Appendix 1. The Audience for Veterans Operations and Related Content on Twitter  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Full visualisation of the audience for Veterans Operations and Related Content on Twitter 
Authors’ calculations from data sampled 02/4/-02/5/ 2017 
 
Each node in this network represents an account on Twitter. Each node belongs to both a broad group 
and a smaller segment within that group.  The size of the node is proportional to the number of other 
map nodes that follow it on Twitter. The colour of the node is based on its parent segment.  
A segment is a collection of nodes with a shared pattern of interest while a group is a collection of 
segments that are geographically, culturally, or socially similar.  
The nodes are placed within the map using a Fruchterman-Reingold visualization algorithm. This 
works to place nodes into the map according to two principles: first, a “centrifugal force” acts upon 
each node to push it to the edge of the canvas; second, a “cohesive force” acts upon every connected 
pair of nodes to push them closer together. 
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Full list of Groups and Segments for the Twitter Map 
 
Group Segment Group Segment  Group Segment  
Russia-
Focus 
Pro Putin Trolls / 
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Politics 
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/Congress 
Pro Putin Russian 
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True American 
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Tech and Finance 
News 
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Russia / Trump 
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Trump 
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Education 
Pro Putin 
Russians / 
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Pundit / Fox 
US Gov / 
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Other 
Pop Culture 
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 Appendix 2. Audience for Veterans Operations and Related Content on Facebook  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Full visualisation of the audience for Veterans Operations and Related Content on 
Facebook 
Authors’ calculations from data sampled 26/5/-25/6/ 2017 
 
Each node in this network represents a public page on Facebook. The size of the node corresponds to 
the number of other nodes in the map that like the page on Facebook. Each node belongs to both a 
broad group and a smaller segment within that group.  A segment is a collection of nodes with a 
shared pattern of interest while a group is a collection of segments that are geographically, culturally, 
or socially similar 
 
Again, a Fruchterman-Reingold visualization algorithm is used to place nodes within the map.  
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Full list of Groups and Segments for the Facebook Map 
 
Group Segments  Group Segments  Group Segments 
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US Forces / Korea 
Intl Direct 
Democracy|Anon   
  Occupy   
 
 
Occupy|Economic 
Inequality   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Additional Methodological Descriptions 
 
Appendix 3. Heterophily Index 
 
For every pairing of groups within a network map, a value of heterophily can be calculated. This is a 
measure of the level of connection between the groups. In order to determine this a ratio is calculated 
of the actual ties between two groups compared to the expected ties between the groups if all the 
accounts in the map were evenly distributed.  
 
The natural log of these ratios is then taken, along with a zero correction to create a balanced index 
and ensure that all values are displayed in a positive form.  
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Expression A:  Ratio of Two Ratios 
 
This heterophily index is therefore created through a ratio of two ratios.  The ratio of these two ratios 
reveals whether two nodes have about the proportion of links they should have given its size. This is 
displayed in Expression A, where a pairing of groups is calculated as having a measure of connections 
in balance with its share of all the connections. 
 
Half the distribution of possible values from this ratio of ratios ranges from 0 to 1 (a disproportionately 
small share of connections in a group given its size) and the other half ranges from 1 to +infinity (a 
disproportionately large share of connections in a group given its size).  However, by taking the natural 
log of the ratio of ratios the index will become more balanced: from -infinity to 0 becomes less than 
proportionate share, and from 0 to +infinity becomes more than proportionate share. 
 
For example, take a three-group network (A, B and C). If nodes in group A have a total of ten 
connections, and there are ten nodes in each group, then the expected connections between A and B 
will be 3.33. If, in reality, the nodes in group A actually have all ten connections to nodes in group B 
then this connection is stronger than expected. The heterophily score for groups A and B = 10/3.33 = 
3.0. The natural log of this is then taken along with a zero correction across the range of heterophily 
values.  
 
A greater heterophily index indicates a denser pattern of connections between the two groups. It is 
important to note however that these scores indicate only first order connections, not second or third 
order connections. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4. Clustering for groups and Segments  
 
In order to generate segments and groups for each map it is necessary to employ a clustering 
algorithm.  
 
This involves first building a bipartite graph between nodes in the map and the rest of the social 
medium in question. This bipartite graph provides a structural similarity metric between nodes in the 
map.  
 
This was then used in combination with a hierarchical agglomerative clustering algorithm in order to 
segment a map into distinct communities. This is a ‘bottom up’ approach whereby each observation 
starts in its own cluster, and pairs of clusters are merged as one moves up the hierarchy. 
 
Twitter maps are clustered based on follower relationships, since mentions relationships have been 
shown to overemphasize the news cycle and salient external events. Facebook networks are clustered 
based on page likes. 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 5. K-core reduction  
 
To identify and map the ‘discussion core’ of the most active, connected, and influential users, we 
performed a k-core reduction to reduce the total collected set of Twitter users from the initial data 
collection into a set of well-connected accounts. This produces a maximally connected subgraph of 
active nodes with degree of connection at least ‘k’.  
 
This degree of connection, k, can be thought of as the number of links between each node in the graph. 
For example, selecting a k value of 0 for the reduction not remove any nodes from the graph, since each 
node must have 0 connections or greater. Selecting a k value of 1 would remove all of the nodes that 
have no connections to other nodes in the graph. Selecting a k value of 2 would remove all nodes with 
fewer than 2 connections, and so on.  
 
A value of k was selected such that the k-core consisted of 12,413 users. This value was found to be a 
sufficiently large group to represent the major sets of highly active users, but not so large as to make 
clustering and visualization impractical. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
